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The Struggle for Justice and Reconciliation  
in Post-Suharto Indonesia
Kimura Ehito*
What explains the failure of transitional justice and reconciliation measures in post-
authoritarian Indonesia?  One explanation is that domestic political elites have effec-
tively stymied the efforts of civil society to implement global norms of transitional 
justice.  However, as Indonesia has embraced a democratic and decentralized sys-
tem of government, even the most corrupt and entrenched elites cannot merely 
veto or reject calls for justice.  Instead, opponents have used a variety of strategies 
including legislative, religious, and cultural strategies to undermine justice initia-
tives.  Examining the recent experiences in Indonesia, this paper shows the effects 
that a limited transition has had on the justice agenda.
Keywords: Indonesia, transitional justice, reconciliation,  
truth and reconciliation commission, human rights
Introduction
Over a decade now since the fall of Suharto little to no justice has been served for the 
many and past human rights violations of the authoritarian New Order (Aspinall 2008; 
Frease 2003; ICTJ and Kontras 2011).  The violations include: mass killings of commu-
nists and alleged communists in 1965–1966, political repression, military violence and 
torture against civilians, human rights violations in East Timor, Aceh, and Papua, and the 
repression of basic rights to freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
What explains this failure in justice?  A report by the International Center for Tran-
sitional Justice argues that progress has been blocked by “a deep, systemic unwillingness 
to uncover the truth surrounding serious human rights violations and hold those who are 
responsible accountable for their actions” (ICTJ and Kontras 2011).  The implicit sug-
gestion is that national and local political elites have effectively stymied the efforts of civil 
society to implement norms of justice and reconciliation that have been spreading glob-
ally now since the end of the Cold War.
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This perspective seems apt especially given the view that Indonesia’s transition has 
achieved only limited or partial reform and characterized instead by entrenched elites or 
oligarchs (Robison and Hadiz 2004; Slater 2004).  However, as Indonesia has embraced 
a democratic and decentralized system of government, even the most corrupt and 
entrenched elites cannot merely veto or reject calls for justice.  Instead, opponents of 
the justice agenda have used a variety of tools to hamper justice and reconciliation mea-
sures.  Put differently, the phenomenon of transitional justice is more than simply a 
transposing of a global norm onto a local site.  In post-authoritarian polities, concepts 
such as justice and reconciliation are often re-defined and re-articulated at key moments 
in a politicized arena.  Examining the recent experiences in Indonesia, this paper high-
lights the “how” of failure, the strategies by which justice and reconciliation in Indonesia 
have come to be stymied.
In so doing, this article examines several cases that highlight those strategies.  The 
first, an institutional strategy, led to the process of cooptation.  The attempt to build a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) emerged from activists and civil society 
organizations but came to be coopted into a law that would emphasize amnesty over 
accountability.  At the same time, many groups, international and local alike, have turned 
to alternative forms of justice that employ traditional, cultural, and/or religious practices. 
While successful in some instances, forms of “traditional” and in particular, Islamic justice 
have also been used to avoid and even undermine forms of accountability.  In the Tanjung 
Priok case, military officers responsible for the violence against Muslims in a Jakarta 
neighborhood proposed to settle matters through islah, an Islamic form of peace making. 
In Aceh, practices of diyat and peusijuek have led to debates about whether to use alter-
native or traditional forms of reconciliation or national legal mechanisms to prosecute 
individuals.  While proponents have argued that these cultural practices offer an alterna-
tive way to resolve conflicts, critics have derided the cooptation of Islamic and traditional 
principles for their own self-protection.
To be sure, this essay is not an exhaustive examination of all the reasons that the 
transitional justice agenda has failed in Indonesia.  Those reasons are many and wide 
ranging including a weak judiciary, corruption, lack of political will, and the like.  Instead, 
the article highlights some of the “softer” strategies elites have used to confound justice 
initiatives.  It suggests that in post-authoritarian polities like Indonesia, a new politics is 
possible but faces constraints as old and new players adjust to the new rules of the game.
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The Rise of the Transitional Justice
Exact definitions of transitional justice vary, but it generally refers to the recognition for 
and the righting of past wrongs.  The International Center for Transitional Justice defines 
the concept as measures to “redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses” (ICTJ 
n.d.).  Teitel defines it more specifically as “a conception of justice associated with peri-
ods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of 
repressive predecessor regimes” (Teitel 2003, 69).  Teitel emphasizes the legal aspects 
of transitional justice but as we shall see, it does not always fall into the confines of legal-
ized justice.  Transitional justice includes trials, reparations, truth commissions, and 
lustration but also apologies, rituals, and other symbolic acts.  To varying degrees, all 
forms of transitional justice seek to offer some form of accountability, provide restitution 
for victims, and promote political, economic, and legal reform at the societal level.
The practice of modern day transitional justice can be traced back to World War I 
but it rose in international prominence after World War II and the ensuing Nuremburg 
Trials and Tokyo Tribunals (Teitel 2003).  The Cold War, however, doused hopes of 
international consensus on the role of global institutions for post-conflict justice (Teitel 
2002).  While some countries did implement mechanisms for transitional justice in the 
1970s and 1980s, the end of the Cold War led to a surge in the practice of justice and 
reconciliation measures globally (Kritz and Mandela 1995).
Alongside this reality, transitional justice has grown dramatically as a field of study 
in the past two decades.  It encompasses a vast and interdisciplinary area that includes 
traditional academic disciplines such as political science, law, anthropology, and sociology 
(Bell 2009).  Scholars have asked a variety of questions related to the phenomenon of 
transitional justice.  Much of the work has explored the practical aspects of justice includ-
ing institutional design, costs, and political implications of justice mechanisms (Vinjamuri 
and Sieff 1999).  A related emphasis has consisted of debates in the field about the moral 
and political dilemmas and trade-offs of justice (Mani 2008; Posner and Vermeule 2004; 
Stensrud 2009; Van Zyl 1999).  A third area explores the way in which justice mechanisms 
have spread as a global phenomenon (Ben-Josef Hirsch 2009; Fletcher et al. 2009; Kim 
2008; Lutz and Sikkink 2000).  While addressing the first two questions at the margins, 
the experiences of Indonesia help highlight and challenge some of the arguments made 
about the diffusion of international norms such as transitional justice.
Perhaps the most influential and well-known theories about the spread of transitional 
justice institutions have emerged from the constructivist school in international relations. 
Constructivists have argued that the interests of states and individuals should not be 
taken for granted but rather understood in the context of how they are formed or con-
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structed (Adler 2002; Fearon and Wendt 2002; Wendt 1999).  In this view, ideas play a 
key role in understanding state behavior, which stands in stark contrast to the realist and 
liberal schools of international relations theory.
Along these lines, a significant research agenda among constructivists has been to 
explore how ideas spread in international relations, including ideas such as the respect 
for human rights and prosecution of human rights violations.  Finnemore and Skikkink, 
for example, argued that norm entrepreneurs push for the implementation of ideas until 
they begin to “cascade” and then ultimately become “internalized” (Finnemore and 
 Sikkink 1999).  A second and related theory argues that transnational activist networks 
in particular spurred the diffusion of norms such as environment and human rights by 
offering broad new resources for actors (Keck and Sikkink 1998).
The idea of norms cascading transnationally has been applied to the growing global 
practice of transitional justice mechanisms.  Scholars argue that norm entrepreneurs 
such as activists, NGOs, and other social groups learn from past experiences of transi-
tional justice and diffuse them to other places.  Sikkink describes this process as the rise 
of a “justice cascade” (Lutz and Sikkink 2001; Sikkink 2011).  While this supply side 
theory of norm diffusion is able to recognize a growing trend in the acceptance of tran-
sitional justice, it pays less attention to the different ways in which states actually adopt 
and implement the practice at the domestic level (Cortell and Davis Jr. 2000).
To undertake this task requires examining the different ways in which norms are 
implemented and articulated against the internal machinations of a particular place and 
time (Acharya 2004).  These include the national political institutions but also the sub-
national and regional or local contexts as well.  In another context, Leheny has explored 
the way in which the Japanese state adopted international norms against child pornogra-
phy and new measures of counter-terrorism, both of which could only be understood in 
the context of Japan’s domestic political goals in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Leheny 
2006).  Subotic, looking specifically at transitional justice, argues that such institutions 
can be “hijacked” as in the Balkans precisely because domestic political actors have 
ulterior motives such as eliminating political opponents, receiving international aid, or 
gaining admission into international organizations (Subotic 2009).
In Indonesia too, domestic political actors have sought to subvert or coopt efforts to 
address past human rights abuses.  They have used a variety of strategies in a variety of 
settings from “official” national institutional politics to local and cultural practices.  The 
debate over the truth and reconciliation is one area where this can be seen and is where 
we now turn.
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The Rise and Fall of National Truth and Reconciliation
After the fall of Suharto, activists and victims organizations seized the moment and 
renewed their calls to revisit past violations of human rights during the New Order.  Along 
with a variety of other proposed reform measures including new legislation, fact-finding 
missions, and human rights courts, NGOs and activists also supported the creation of a 
TRC during the reformasi period.  The TRC provides a lens through which to examine 
the politics around transitional justice more generally, in the way that the commission 
became mired in the domestic political debate.  Rather than simply being vetoed, the 
TRC was coopted and ultimately hijacked thereby leading to its failure.
In many ways the narrative of the efforts to create a TRC suggests, at least initially, 
the effects of a “justice cascade” theorized by scholars.  International and Indonesian 
NGOs, some funded by western donors pushed hard for the creation of a TRC.  They 
formed study groups, and invited renowned international scholars and practitioners of 
transitional justice including those who had been intimately involved with the South 
African TRC.1)
The experience of South Africa played a particularly important role in the develop-
ment of the idea of an Indonesian TRC.  Part of this has to do simply with issues of  timing. 
The TRC in South Africa was established in 1995 and conducted the bulk of their work 
from 1995 to 1998.  In Indonesia, the financial crisis struck in 1997, the reformasi move-
ment took off in early 1998, and Suharto stepped down later that year.  It was soon after 
that activists in Indonesia began to explore mechanisms to redress the past, drawing on 
experiences in other parts of the world including South Africa.
But the relationship was more than simply about timing.  For example, Agung  Puteri, 
a key promoter of the TRC and a staff member at ELSAM, the Institute of Policy Research 
and Advocacy, was also a fellow at the Transitional Justice Program at the University of 
Capetown in South Africa in 2002 along with several other Indonesians (Agung Putri 
2003).  In addition, several prominent individuals from South Africa and also from the 
International Center for Transitional Justice based in New York City also worked closely 
with ELSAM and others.  For example, they co-hosted workshops, authored pamphlets 
and reports, and also funded the operations of many of the NGOs (Mashabane 2003).
Once the idea of a TRC came to be introduced, however, it articulated into the 
Indonesian national and local political sphere in particular ways.  For example, debates 
erupted about terminology and the name of the institution.  The military and police fac-
tion in the legislature objected to notions of “truth” or “kebenaran” citing the difficulty 
1) Interview with Zaini Abidin, ELSAM, Jakarta Indonesia, May 30, 2013.
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of finding out the ultimate truth and the need to emphasize reconciliation over truth.  In 
contrast, reform factions with the legislature favored terms such as “accountability” or 
“pertangung jawaban” instead of “truth” (Sulistiyanto 2007, 89).  In other words, the 
translation of the international terms and ideas bumped up against the power dynamics 
embedded in Indonesia’s legislature where the bill was argued.
Debates occurred also among the NGOs at the societal level.  Some NGOs such as 
Kontras (The Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence) argued that 
human rights courts and prosecutions should take priority over a TRC.  Kontras and other 
organizations tended to take a harder line on these issues because they dealt with cases 
involving victims and victims’ families (ibid.).  In contrast, other NGOs such as ELSAM 
expressed reservations about achieving justice through a dysfunctional legal system and 
argued that in any case, a TRC could complement courts and promote healing as victims 
could come forward with their stories.2)
Finally there were particular debates about the power of the TRC itself.  How far 
back would its mandate extend?  Muslim groups, for example were wary of reopening 
the wounds of 1965 which might have implicated many in anti-communist massacres that 
occurred during that time.  Also, would it have the power to give amnesty?  Clearly, the 
military and other potential perpetrators were deeply interested in this question.  What 
would its relation be to other institutions such as the human rights courts that were also 
being established at the same?  In these kinds of questions, the interests of NGOs and 
victims organizations were trumped by state institutions.
In 2000, the MPR called for the creation of a national TRC and in 2004, the legisla-
ture passed Law 27 which required the government to formally establish a TRC.  The 
commission was empowered to receive complaints or statements from perpetrators, 
victims, or victims’ families who are the victim’s heirs, investigate and clarify gross viola-
tions of human rights; provide recommendations to the President concerning appeals 
for amnesty; provide recommendations to the President concerning the awarding of 
compensation and/or rehabilitation; and provide annual reports and final reports to the 
 President.
At the same time, the law that finally emerged from the legislative process had also 
been altered significantly to the disappointment of NGOs and victim’s families.  First, the 
TRC in the bill was empowered to recommend amnesties for perpetrators of serious 
crimes.  Second, language in the legislation indicated that crimes overseen by the TRC 
could not be prosecuted in courts.  Third, the legislation stipulated that victims could 
only receive compensation in exchange for their concurrence of amnesty (ICTJ and 
2) Interview with Ifdhal Kasim, Chairperson of KOMNAS-HAM, August 26, 2012.
The Struggle for Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Suharto Indonesia 79
 Kontras 2011, 29–30).  Taken together, activists supporting the idea of a TRC argued 
that the legislation had effectively become an institution that supported impunity rather 
than something genuinely seeking reconciliation.
Some might argue that the result of the legislative process is always that of com-
promise and so this result was simply the outcome of institutional politics.  However, as 
Ifdahl Kasim noted, the NGOs and activists were not active participants in the debates 
around the legislation.  They were consulted at the early stages and even then there were 
several aspects of the legislation that left many NGOs dissatisfied causing them to with-
draw their initial support.  With many members of the former regime participating in the 
debate including the since-dismantled military party, the legislation proceeded and 
became reshaped according to their own ends.3)
Discontent with the legislation, several NGOs brought a suit against key provisions 
of Law 27 to the Constitutional Court.  The Court agreed that the provision stipulating 
the exchange of amnesty for reparations was in fundamental contradiction to rights 
enshrined in the Constitution and in the principles and practices of international law. 
However, instead of eliminating the particular provisions that were mentioned in the 
suit, the Court struck down the entire law, thereby annulling the entire basis of the TRC. 
For civil society organizations, this proved an enormous setback and an unexpected 
outcome to an otherwise legally sound strategy.  In retrospect many might have preferred 
a flawed TRC to none at all but at the time activists brought the case to the Constitu-
tional Court they did not see their options in those terms.  In this sense, the resulting 
ruling produced the ironic result of a legal victory for proponents that forced them back 
to square one.
The failure of the TRC illustrates the way in which norms of diffusion come to be 
articulated and interpreted in vastly different kinds of ways depending on context.  In one 
sense, we might argue that the TRC became hijacked once it entered the national policy 
making stage.  While international and domestic NGOs promoted what they argued was 
a just and fair institution, it was re-shaped by the bureaucracy and the legislature to 
reflect the interests of actors including the military, many of the Muslim parties, and 
former regimist groups so as to emphasize amnesty and impunity above truth and 
reconciliation.
3) Interview with Ifdhal Kasim, Chairperson of KOMNAS-HAM, August 26, 2012.
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Islamic Justice and the Case of Tanjung Priok
While the articulation between global and national forms of justice and reconciliation are 
critical, there is also increasing attention being paid to alternative forms of justice often 
drawing on local cultural, religious, or traditional practices (Shaw et al. 2010).  Alternative 
forms of justice are defined here as those that employ traditional, cultural, and/or religious 
practices and institutions in order to resolve conflict and repair rifts in the society.  They 
are increasingly seen as a critical response to the global or national mechanisms which 
are seen as formalistic and ultimately ineffective at dealing with issues related to recon-
ciliation (Gready 2005).
The new emphasis on alternative forms of justice and reconciliation is important but 
needs to be treated cautiously.  Practices in Indonesia have been “successful” in some 
instances but the way in which this is defined and the process by which alternative justice 
is carried out is just as important as the actual cultural practice itself.  In the Tanjung 
Priok case, military officers responsible for the violence against Muslims in a Jakarta 
neighborhood proposed to settle matters through islah an Islamic form of peace-making. 
On the one hand, proponents have argued that these cultural practices offer an alternative 
way to resolve conflicts (Hamdi Muluk 2009).  However, critics have argued that the 
military used these approaches for their own self-protection.
Tanjung Priok is a northern sub-district of Jakarta that includes the city’s main 
harbor.  In 1984, tensions between the government and the Muslim communities were 
quite high, particularly in the context of a proposed law that would have required all 
organizations including religious ones to adopt the national pancasila ideology and declare 
their allegiance to it above all other ideologies.  For conservative Muslims this was the 
latest in a series of moves that marginalized religious practices and beliefs in the country 
(Hefner 2000, 121).
In September, a security officer of the neighborhood military command went to a 
local mosque and ordered certain posters be removed from the mosque walls.  Returning 
with several others the next day, the officer found that his orders had been ignored and 
with his men proceeded to forcibly remove the posters.  One officer allegedly entered 
the mosque without removing his shoes and another used gutter water to scrub the walls. 
These represented desecrations of the mosque and led to protests and riots against the 
security officers (Burns 1989).
The police arrested several people whom they accused of disturbing the peace. 
However, a larger demonstration protesting both the arrests as well as the larger issue 
of the pancasila legislation was held on September 12.  On that night a mass meeting being 
held transformed into a mass demonstration with several thousand demonstrators march-
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ing down the main thoroughfares of the sub-district and the police and military opened 
fire on the protestors (Weatherbee 1985).  At the time, most news of the incident was 
suppressed.  The government detailed only that there was a violent incident in the area 
in which eight people had been killed.  There continues to be uncertainty about the 
number of victims but estimates suggest the death toll was in the hundreds (Haryanto 
2010).
Only after the fall of Suharto did the truth about the incident begin to emerge into 
the mainstream consciousness of the populace.  Heavy pressure from NGOs and also 
Islamic organizations pushed Suharto’s successor Habibie to re-open the case (Junge 
2008, 11).  As a result, the government opened several investigations into the events 
surrounding the Tanjung Priok incident (ibid., 20).  While some of the investigations 
provided credible evidence and recommended prosecuting key officers, little has come 
of these recommendations.
To be sure, the government did establish an ad hoc human rights court that began 
in September 2003 (Muningaar Sri Sawaswati 2003).  This represented one of two ad hoc 
tribunals that tried officers involved in the incident for crimes against humanity.  How-
ever, the trial itself came under heavy criticism for a number of reasons.  First, only 
relatively low and mid-ranking officers were brought to trial.  The people who would have 
been actual decision-makers in the incident including General Try Sutrisno were curi-
ously left out of the indictment.  Second, blatant intimidation occurred at the trial as 
members of the military in attendance threatened victims and others at the trial, and 
allegedly threatened some judges.  Third, many of the defendants actually changed their 
testimony from the initial statements made before the trial to investigators and lawyers 
and despite this the court did nothing to deal with these obvious changes.  Finally, of the 
14 accused, initially 2 were acquitted and 12 were convicted in the court, but all convic-
tions were overturned on appeal, resulting in zero convictions (Usman Hamid 2009).
The context of this failure is important.  Two years before in March of 2001, General 
Try Sutrisno who was the commanding officer of the military regional command in Jakarta 
and generally considered one of the key figures responsible for the Tanjung Priok inci-
dent, invited victims and victims’ families for a dialogue.  Sutrisno called this meeting an 
islah or an Islamic form of peacemaking (Jakarta Post, September 22, 2001).  Islah is 
derived from the Arabic word that means “to repair” or to “reform” and is practiced as 
an effort to achieve reconciliation between two people in a fight or dispute (Waterson 
2009).  In other words, Sutrisno was asking families to think about resolving the issue 
using a traditional cultural instrument rather than a modern institutional one.
The event began as a kind of open forum where participants, mostly on the military 
side, emphasized the importance of forgetting the past and building a “peaceful future” 
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(Fadjar Thufail 2011).  Sutrisno and the other military members offered financial assis-
tance to those who had been affected by the incident.  The money was carefully referred 
to as bantuan keuangan or financial assistance rather than kompensasi or compensation. 
Fadjar Thufail notes that this included about $200 of tali kasih or affection money to the 
families of each victim or political prisoner.  The military also appears to have delivered 
motorcycles to those who might benefit from their use in business.  However, these 
motorcycles never reached their intended recipient and were apparently sold off and the 
money was kept by the people entrusted to deliver them (ibid.).
The event concluded with the signing of an “Islah Charter” which was a document 
that cited verses from the Koran and called on the government to offer compensation 
and restitution to the victims (Jakarta Post, September 22, 2001).  As Fadjar Thufail notes, 
it was in no way a legal document, but as family members and military officers signed the 
document it came to resemble a contract or official document.  Sutrisno also infused the 
ceremony with legitimacy by inviting and involving Nurcholish Madjid, a prominent 
Islamic scholar to the event and having him oversee the event including the signing of 
the document (Fadjar Thufail 2011).
The Islah Charter did not forbid those who signed it from testifying in the ad hoc 
tribunal.  In fact, many people who took the tali kasih from Sutrisno said explicitly at the 
time that they still wanted a proper investigation and justice pursued despite taking 
money.  Nonetheless, the distribution of money to the victims created a major rift 
between the “pro-islah” faction and the “anti-islah” faction (Sri Suparyati 2004).  This is 
what led to the inconsistencies at the ad hoc tribunal.  Some victims and families who 
testified to investigators before the islah event withdrew or changed their testimony at 
the actual tribunal itself (Urip Hudiono 2003).
The Tanjung Priok incident and the events of the islah in particular provide a glimpse 
into the way traditional practices can undermine certain aspects of justice and reconcili-
ation.  To be sure there are benefits of a religious resolution to the conflict.  A number 
of factors make the islah process palatable.  First, it was done in a way that was sensitive 
to the cultural background of the victims.  Notwithstanding the fact that the army during 
this time period was often perceived as being a more Catholic or Christian institution, 
the pursuit of a resolution that went outside the formal legal system and relied on tradi-
tional Islamic principles appealed to some victims’ families.  Along those lines, the fact 
that some families rejected the financial assistance and refused to sign the charter indi-
cates the lack of heavy coercion.
However, the army clearly succeeded in weakening the legal case against them.  By 
dividing the victims’ groups into different camps, they prevented a potentially concerted 
effort of the victims to rally around the trial.  Although ultimately, a trial did go forward, 
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it was weakened so fundamentally that none of the convictions could withstand the pro-
cess of appeal.  Furthermore, many participants noted afterward that there was little new 
information about the Tanjung Priok incident.  The military members who attended 
offered no apology, no further explanation about the incident, and no more information 
about missing persons.  It was also noted later that the military had dominated the floor 
and little time was given to the victims and families in the event.
In this sense, the main problem with the islah approach was not the use of the cul-
tural practices to resolve a dispute and make efforts at reconciliation.  If the charter and 
the payments had emerged after a process of consultation between the military and the 
victims and resulted in a final outcome after a number of different options were consid-
ered, the event might have had some degree of legitimacy.  As it was, the military 
announced the meeting, initiated it, and came with their own agenda.  Little room was 
left for voices of the victims themselves.
Justice and Reconciliation in Aceh
Alternative forms of justice and reconciliation have also been prevalent in Aceh.  After 
decades of separatist conflict and a devastating tsunami in 2004, international negotia-
tors brokered a ceasefire between the Acehnese rebels (GAM) and government forces 
in 2005 (Aspinall 2005).  However, after the ceasefire, tensions still remained high as the 
region had to deal with a long legacy of trauma and violence.  Casualties of the conflict 
are estimated about 15,000 dead and another 100,000 displaced.  Furthermore, a Harvard 
Medical School survey estimates large percentages of people who had lived through 
combat experiences, fled from danger, had family members or friends killed, or experi-
enced extortion and robbery (International Organization for Migration 2006).  Social 
devastation was also high with high levels of poverty especially in rural areas and damage 
to major infrastructure such as schools, clinics, roads, and utilities.
The peace agreement established four mechanisms to implement peace between 
the two sides.  First it called for an amnesty for the rebel fighters of GAM.  Second, it 
outlined a timetable and benchmarks for demobilization, disarmament, and decommis-
sioning of GAM and Indonesian forces.  Third, it established a reintegration agenda for 
combatants, political prisoners, and civilians of the conflict.  And finally, it recommended 
the establishment of a human rights court and a TRC for Aceh.  The Aceh Monitoring 
Mission (AMM), composed of international observers, was given the task of monitoring 
and supporting the peace process in Aceh (Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement 2005).
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While the logistics of putting the plan in place proved difficult, many aspects were 
successfully implemented.  However, the justice and reconciliation agenda proved to be 
an utter failure.  The proposed human rights court for Aceh has still not been set up 
despite a law calling for its establishment.  Furthermore, that law itself states that the 
court will only have the power to review human rights violations after 2006, meaning 
past violations will not be under the purview of the court.  A TRC for Aceh was outlined 
in the Helsinki Peace Accords, but has not been officially established because it is sup-
posed to operate under the framework of a national TRC which was ruled unconstitutional 
in 2006 (Aspinall 2008).4)
In this context, local traditional practices have also been employed as a way to 
address victims in the region.  Diyat and peusijuek are two such examples.  Both practices 
adhere to local traditional beliefs and practices.  For example, diyat has roots in Islam 
while peusijuek seems to be an indigenous Acehnese practice.  At the same time, both 
of these practices have also come under criticism for undermining aspects of justice and 
reconciliation.
Diyat is an Arabic term referring to payments made to the next of kin of those killed 
or disappeared in conflict.  The term comes from Islamic jurisprudence and is practiced 
in many countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia where Islam is prominent (Warren 
and Press 2010, 27).  In Pakistan for example, diyat was re-introduced as part of its 
national criminal code in 1990 and gives the victims of serious intentional battery and 
heirs of murder victims the opportunity to enforce punishment (qisas), negotiated settle-
ment (diyat), or waive their rights to prosecute perpetrators altogether (Palo 2008).  In 
the post-conflict situations of Darfur and Somalia, programs of transitional justice have 
also sought to integrate local traditional practices including diyat in “hybrid” justice 
mechanisms (Kritz and Wilson 2010–11; Zuin 2008).
In Aceh, diyat was not part of the criminal code, but payments to victims or heirs 
were initiated in the early 2000s by the governor at the time, Azwar Abubakar, in an effort 
to dampen the intensity of the conflict in the region.  Local government officials believed 
that GAM’s recruitment was being driven by those who sought to avenge the death of a 
slain family member.  Diyat was seen as a culturally sensitive and appropriate way to 
cushion to intensity of the conflict.  It was also consistent with moves to allow the Aceh 
region the implement some forms of Islamic law that might also undermine support for 
the insurgency (Aspinall 2008, 25).
According to Islamic practice, a standard payment for diyat is 100 camels.  The 
government decided to make payments of 50 million rupiah, revised upwards to 60 mil-
4) There have been recent initiatives to establish a TRC in Aceh but the process has yet to be officially 
approved.
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lion rupiah (about USD $6500), roughly the equivalent of 10 buffaloes.  However, citing 
insufficient funds, the government paid out three million rupiah and committed to monthly 
payments until the entire sum had been paid (ibid.).  By June of 2007, the government 
had made some 20,000 diyat payments to victims’ families averaging the equivalent of 
about $200–$300 per family (Clarke et al. 2008, 27).  Payments were generally made to 
the next of kin based on village level data.  Some received only the initial payment while 
others appear to have received more before the diyat program was ended along with other 
major reintegration programs in 2007.
Despite the extensiveness of the diyat program, a number of problems also surfaced. 
Critics argued that the choice of who received payments relied almost always on local 
government as well as the security sector including the military, the latter often having 
been complicit in the very crimes being addressed.  Furthermore, these decisions tended 
to be subjective and based around who suffered harm during the prolonged conflict in 
Aceh (ibid., 31).  Some of the victims report that they were simply asked their bank 
account information and received deposits in their accounts with no information on why 
they were receiving the money.  Stories also abound of corruption where portions of the 
diyat payment were taken by keuciks, camats, and others (United Nations Development 
Programme and Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional 2006, 37).
These issues point to an even larger problem, that payments for diyat were separated 
from any kind of process related to accountability.  Under Islamic law, the family typically 
decides whether or not to accept diyat, or choose to have the perpetrator executed (an 
“eye for an eye”).  But under the system in Aceh, payments were made independent of 
any knowledge about the perpetrator (Aspinall 2008, 25).  No investigations were made 
and no information was recorded.  In this context, it left many recipients deeply unsatis-
fied.  As one female victim notes: “My child is dead as a consequence, then it is paid with 
3 million rupiahs [approximately $300] diyat.  Is that justice?  Not according to me, 
because my child’s life has been tagged one life, 3 million rupiahs” (Clarke et al. 2008, 23).
The larger point here is that like in Tanjung Priok, Islamic tradition has been invoked 
in a way that selectively avoids notions of responsibility and accountability.  Diyat was 
designed as a way to soften victim anger and prevent them from joining GAM.  To be 
sure, it was an effective mechanism to do this and a situation in Aceh without diyat may 
very well have been a worse alternative.  However, to the extent that the peace agree-
ment promised notions of justice and accountability, the diyat program provided neither.
Another local ritual commonly practiced, especially after the conflict was called 
peusijuek.5)  Peusijuek is a ritual performed to show that harmony and peace have been 
5) Avonius has written about this practice and the case described below draws primarily on her 
research (Avonius 2009).
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restored to a community after a disruptive incident.  Typically a conflict would be resolved 
through an apology and some compensation to a victim.  The ritual itself involves pouring 
sacred water, yellow rice, or powder on the parties as a way to symbolize the reconcili-
ation between disputants.  Peusijuek was performed in villages throughout Aceh when 
communities welcomed back former GAM combatants (Braithwaite 2010).  It was also 
used to resolve small conflicts such as fights and brawls that occurred after the peace 
accords and as the peace accords were still being implemented.
Avonius recounts an incident in 2004 that occurred after the peace agreement in 
Aceh where violence erupted after the army beat a former GAM soldier who had been 
riding a motorcycle by the military post.  Local residents argued that the military no 
longer had the right to detain people since Aceh was no longer a conflict zone.  When 
AMM monitors and local police arrived at the military post, shooting broke out and one 
former rebel fighter was shot in the chest and several others were injured (Avonius 2009).
The military commander of the region suggested that the parties use alternative 
practices such as peusijuek to resolve the tensions between the military and the local 
population.  Members of the international AMM supported this idea and suggested that 
it be used in the aforementioned case.  Subsequently, two high-ranking officers of the 
Indonesian military visited the home of the young man who was killed and offered 
financial assistance for the family, the traditional gesture among disputants between 
victims and perpetrators.  They also presented a letter for the family to sign.  The letter 
gave permission for the officers to remove the bullet from the victim’s body, and it 
stated that the family would not lay any charges against the perpetrators.  The parents 
of the victim allowed the officers to remove the bullet, but refused to sign the letter 
(ibid.).
Most local groups also rejected the idea of using traditional reconciliatory measures 
and peusijuek for this particular case.  One of the ex-combatants involved in the incident 
specifically stated that he did not want to reconcile with the military in this instance.  “I 
do not want to have peusijuek with the military.  There is no need for a settlement, first 
they beat up someone and then they ask for peace” (ibid., 126).  He argued that Indone-
sians should follow the rule of law and his friend should have justice carried out according 
to the laws of the Indonesia.  In many ways, this is a remarkable statement from an 
individual who had fought against Indonesia for so many years, precisely because the 
laws of Indonesia were seen as marginalizing the peoples of Aceh.
Others also opposed the use of peusijuek.  For example, several of the local NGOs 
including the local director of the Institute for Legal Aid (LBH) argued the case should 
be brought before a court of law.  The director of the Aceh Judicial Monitoring Institute 
(AJMI) also opposed peusijuek and criticized members of the AMM who were advocating 
The Struggle for Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Suharto Indonesia 87
for peusijuek saying that they should be simple monitors rather than dispensing advice 
on conflict resolution (Avonius 2009).
It should be noted that this case is not necessarily representative of attitudes towards 
peusijuek more broadly.  In fact, the ritual was practiced to the satisfaction of many 
throughout the region, and often included military officers as well (Clarke et al. 2008, 14). 
The point here is that in some cases, and in this case in particular, justice has to be 
understood in context.  Peusijeuk came to be seen not as a communal way to reconcile, 
but as a way for perpetrators to escape accountability.  As Avonius points out, ironically 
local actors rejected the alternative practices while outside actors including the AMM 
and the military pushed for them.
The cases above highlight the dilemma of alternative forms of justice.  On the one 
hand, practices like islah, diyat and peusijeuk offer forms of justice outside of the official 
legal realm to resolve conflict and bring about reconciliation.  In the first two examples, 
there is an emphasis on Islamic social ethics including explicit references to the Koran 
and related religious practices.  In peusijeuk, the social ethics emerges from local indig-
enous practices that draw legitimacy from the involvement of community leaders and 
members.  The cases then draw on plural forms of legitimacy and show how justice and 
reconciliation are being done differently.
On the other hand, these cases also identify the potential dangers in embracing these 
alternative approaches.  While embedding transitional justice in local institutions and 
culture may give them more legitimacy, in these cases it also became an ideal strategy 
to avoid accountability and legal consequences for perpetrator groups while still offering 
a patina of legitimacy.  In some instances, the embrace of the alternative approaches 
actively undermined contemporaneous legal proceedings.  The islah process, for example, 
weakened the criminal prosecution in the ad hoc court and the peusijeuk case in Aceh 
was considered a substitute for legal prosecution.  In this sense, while some have argued 
that official institutional approaches and “softer” approaches can be complementary, 
these examples also show the ways in which one the latter interferes with the former.
In part, much of the problem appears also to be the way in which the cultural or 
traditional approaches have been a largely one-sided affair with little discussion or con-
sultation and almost clinically separated from notions of accountability.  Thus, even 
judged on their own terms, these alternative approaches caused controversy and division 
and in some cases were actively opposed by victims and their organizations.  For many, 
the approaches employed in these particular cases came to be viewed cynically as a way 
to co-opt a traditional practice and circumvent mechanisms of accountability.
These alternative institutions also raise questions about the role of the state and 
whether these approaches also absolve the state from responsibility in past violence.  In 
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Indonesia’s case, the state played a central role in much of the violence during Suharto’s 
tenure in part because the military was at the core of the New Order state itself.  But 
justice and reconciliation initiatives between say, army officers involved in the incident, 
and the victims are distinct from initiatives that recognize the Indonesian state itself as 
a perpetrator of the past violence.  To be sure, the role and responsibility of the state is 
invoked implicitly each of these cases.  In the islah, the document that emerges and is 
signed and is affixed with official looking seals and calls on the state to provide restitution. 
The practice of diyat is Islamic in principle but is administered by provincial government 
of Aceh.  The peusijeuk was encouraged by government and military officials.  However, 
emphasizing the religious, cultural, and traditional approaches not only circumvents 
accountability of the actors but also of state accountability more generally even though 
the state ultimately wielded much of the responsibility for past abuses.
Conclusion
The experience of transitional justice in Indonesia illustrates some of the larger and 
continued problems of governance in post-Suharto Indonesia where the rules of the 
game have changed, but many of the players remain the same.  Many from the New Order 
era have little interest either in looking backward, or downward to the larger social forces 
at play.
This has been manifested in Indonesia’s legislature which is increasingly dysfunc-
tional and not able to pass very much meaningful reform legislation.  While the early 
years after Suharto produced some significant gains in reforms including constitutional 
amendments, legislative hearings, and even some concessions on human rights courts, 
this has become much more difficult over the past six years or so when legislative politics 
has shifted from what Harold Crouch calls “crisis driven politics” to “politics as usual” 
(Crouch 2010).
The failure of transitional justice also reflects an incomplete reform of the military. 
While the military has stepped away from the official arena of politics, it still wields a 
great deal of autonomy because of its financial independence and its territorial structure. 
Their involvement in all of the cases of alternative or “traditional” justice reflects their 
continued ability to set the agenda and protect their own interests.
Finally, we see a weak judicial system where courts either overstep their own 
jurisdiction as appears to be the case of the Constitutional Court case on the TRC legis-
lation, or a court that appears unable or unwilling to prosecute perpetrators as evidenced 
by the Tanjung Priok case.  The weakness of the judiciary is perhaps a key reason why 
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so little justice has been seen in the post-Suharto era.
It is also worth noting that even at the societal level, the calls for justice have 
sometimes been uneven and even muted.  While many NGOs and other social organiza-
tions have been involved in the push for transitional justice, there is also reluctance and 
antipathy among broad swaths of the population about past events that frustrates activists 
as well.  For example, on the issue of the 1965 killings, many Indonesians still accept the 
official state version of events that the killing of hundreds of thousands of alleged com-
munists was necessary to save the Indonesian state.  The presidential election of 2014 
also featured, former Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto who was directly involved 
in several of Indonesia’s most prominent human rights abuses suggesting a penchant at 
least among some in the general population to overlook his past record.  These factors 
too certainly influenced the trajectory of transitional justice in Indonesia.
However, this is not simply to suggest that old elites and opponents of the justice 
agenda can do as they please.  In fact, there have been some significant changes to human 
rights institutions in Indonesia including new legislation, a more empowered human 
rights commission, and a more vibrant civil society.  This has meant that the players have 
had to adjust their strategies as a way to protect their interests and positions in the new 
system.  In the area of transitional justice, this has involved a variety of strategies both 
institutional and extra-institutional.
The example of the TRC shows the way in which legislation in the democratic 
process can be coopted in ways that run contrary to the original aims of activists and 
victims organizations.  Similarly, religious and other cultural practices have also faced 
cooptation in some instances.  Opponents to transitional justice are not standing idle as 
the institutional rules have changed.  Instead they are using a wide variety of tools to 
counter the efforts to revisit the past.  Not all these strategies are successful, but this 
essay has tried to highlight some of the processes that have frustrated reformers because 
of the nebulous way in which legitimate institutions are used to hinder a political agenda 
around transitional justice.
While this article does not mean to suggest that all prospects for addressing past 
violations of human rights in Indonesia are doomed, it points to the particular challenges 
of states that undergo limited or gradual processes of transition in Southeast Asia and 
elsewhere.  Said differently, elite continuity may emerge for a variety of factors, but one 
of them may be the nature of the transitional process itself.  For example Posner and 
Vermeule highlight four kinds of transitions: foreign-led, opposition-led, elite-led, and 
bargain and argue that foreign-led transitions tend to lead to more complete transitional 
justice while the other types lead to more limited forms (Posner and Vermeule 2004). 
This is because international organizations, often the United Nations, take on the cost of 
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the justice initiative and offer cover for the groups who support it while able to convince 
or coerce resistant groups.  On the other hand, opposition-led and elite-led transitions 
are in varying degrees, reluctant to carry out justice because they themselves may have 
little to gain.
In Southeast Asia, Cambodia and Timor Leste can be characterized as foreign-led 
transitions and these are the two states that have had some degree of justice and recon-
ciliation mechanisms put in place.  The Philippines is arguably opposition-led and Indo-
nesia’s transition can be characterized as elite-led and both of these countries have had 
much less success.  In these latter cases, the elites had a direct or indirect role in the 
violations of the past and are reluctant to introduce initiatives that would implicate them-
selves or force them to be accountable for past deeds.  By extension, the gradual transi-
tion currently underway in Myanmar is likely to be a difficult road for advocates of tran-
sitional justice initiatives to traverse.
Globally, Indonesia’s experience may also be a cautionary tale for transitional justice 
at a time when it is being embraced in the Middle East and North Africa and other parts 
of the world.  It suggests that attention to national and local political and institutional 
contexts are also critical.  Justice measures are prone to cooptation or failure particularly 
in the presence of elite continuity and a weak civil society.  In fact, the early experiences 
of Latin America in the 1980s may be regarded as somewhat more successful than Indo-
nesia in part because of a clear break from the past and a revival of a popular left which 
was wiped out in the context of Indonesia.
The push for justice and reconciliation in post-authoritarian Indonesia thus also 
complicates our understanding of the way norms of transitional justice appear to be 
spreading around the globe.  On the one hand, this is not a norm adopted and implemented 
in an unproblematic fashion.  In Indonesia, the pressures for transitional justice have 
appeared both externally and internally but its implementation has largely been a failure. 
At the same time, transitional justice mechanisms have also filtered down to local level 
initiatives which use local cultural practices as a way to achieve notions of justice and 
reconciliation that differ significantly from international and national models.  That said, 
there are still many instances both at the national and local level where these institutions 
have been coopted using new strategies for political survival and domination.
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